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Abstract 
This study undertakes a unique comparison into the relative efficacy of four well established 
liquidity measures, namely turnover, proportion of daily zero returns, Amihud (2002) and 
Liu (2006), in explaining the bid-ask spread plus brokerage costs when powerful and 
common firm governance mechanisms are taken into account as controls.  These are 
representative of ownership of listed firms by state, long term foreign partners, 
entrepreneurial founders, single family entities, extended family groups and business 
networks, domestic and foreign venture capitalists.  An additional control for firms within 
business network controlled by former Tunisian premier, Ben Ali, and Morocco’s royal 
family is also included.  Using a unique sample of all listed firms across the equity markets 
of Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria I find evidence of equity capital rationing during 
the Arab Spring period of political upheaval.  Less well regulated SME markets such as 
Morocco’s marche croissance have liquidity-based transactions costs attributable to Arab 
Spring four times those of the marche principal while those in Egypt’s Nilex are twenty 
times those of the prestigious EGX30 index.  Finally the greatest changes in political risks 
associated with aggregate liquidity across the Arab Spring are democratic accountability, 
military in politics, and law and order. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The events collectively referred to as the Arab Spring, which started in Tunisia in mid-
December 2010 with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, has generated an 
unprecedented wave of political upheaval across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region (BBC website, 2012).  In North Africa alone this has resulted in the popular overthrow 
of governments in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt while substantial political and governmental 
reforms have been conceded in Morocco and to a lesser extent Algeria.  These reforms have 
focussed principally on the dismantlement of narrow, rigidly controlled political economies 
dominated by military social elites with considerable vested interests and private benefits of 
control.  A major implication of these reforms is the impact on economy-wide transactions 
costs which in turn has implications for listed firms across the Maghreb region.  As such the 
principal research question is to study the impact of Arab Spring political upheaval on the 
liquidity-based transactions costs in listed firms within different listings compartments, 
characterised by varying regulatory strength, in stock markets across North Africa. 
 The literature studying the efficacy of the considerable number of liquidity measures 
is well developed with this principally being focussed into two distinct strands.  The first 
adopts a single-country perspective with studies such as Ghysels and Cherkaoui (2003) on 
Morocco and Lagoarde-Segot (2011) on Tunisia.  These typically note the limitations in 
applicability of liquidity measures formulated in a developed, well regulated market setting, 
such as United States, in small, relatively inactive emerging markets where illiquidity is a 
particularly acute issue.  The second strand is colloquially referred to as liquidity “horse 
races” with this focussing on the explicit contrasting of the robustness of a plethora of 
different measures in capturing liquidity.  Lesmond (2005) studies the efficacy of four low 
trading frequency measures of liquidity in explaining total trading costs, defined as bid-ask 
spread plus broker commissions for a round-trip trade (both buy and sell legs) across a sample 
of 23 larger emerging markets.  The liquidity constructs being the price-impact measure of 
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Amihud (2002), ubiquitous turnover ratio, effective spread measure of Roll (1984), and a zero 
returns indicator of Lesmond, Ogden and Trzinka (1999), henceforth LOT, that assumes a 
stock returns generating process determined by capital asset pricing model and uses a 
maximum likelihood application.  Hasbrouck (2009) runs tests between four effective 
liquidity cost measures while the earlier LOT (1999) study finds evidence that the LOT zero 
returns measure outperforms both the Roll effective spread and simple proportion of daily 
zero returns (in this case evaluated over an annual time frame) measures.  A serious drawback 
with all of these earlier horse race studies is their employment of annual or quarterly 
frequency liquidity measures.  This is despite a now considerable literature relating to the 
incorporation of liquidity premia into asset pricing models that use monthly frequency data 
(see Pastor and Stambaugh (2003); Watanabe and Watanabe (2006) and Liu (2006)).  
Recently a study by Goyenko et al (2009) addressed this issue in undertaking a horse races 
analysis of 12 spread proxies and 12 price impact proxies in their ability to explain three 
liquidity benchmarks, with these being effective spread (of Lee and Ready, 1991), realized 
spread (of Huang and Stoll, 1991) and price impact (of Hasbrouck, 2009), using both annual 
and monthly frequency data.  However while benefitting from studying a comprehensive 
array of liquidity measures a prominent shortfall is the lack of applicability of many of the 
measures in the context of smaller, less well regulated and active emerging markets.  A very 
recent study by Hearn and Piesse (2013) partly addressed this issue in studying the efficacy of 
low frequency liquidity measures, namely turnover, multidimensional trading speed Liu (2006) 
indicator, and LOT (1999) proportion of zero returns in explaining total trading costs across a 
sample of Sub Saharan African (SSA) countries.  However a common drawback across all 
these prior studies is a uniform observation time frame within which to study liquidity.  A 
unique feature of the onset of the recent Arab Spring political upheavals in Egypt and Tunisia 
is the dismantling of autocratic state regimes with the being superseded by democratic 
popularist governments.  This dramatic political change has been matched by substantial 
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reforms permeating throughout the economies across the Maghreb region.  Consequently the 
onset of Arab Spring facilitates a unique study of the efficacy of an array of liquidity 
measures in capturing liquidity in equity markets embedded in two very different state level 
governance systems.  These being: unreformed autocratic before a transition to reforming 
democratic popularist governments.  This forms my first contribution to the literature. 
 The Hearn and Piesse (2013) study also partly addressed issues arising from a fairly 
extensive literature regarding the impact of concentrated block ownership on liquidity (see 
Chung et al (2010) and Edmans et al (2013) for full discussion) through the inclusion of a 
series of (1/0) dummy variables controlling for the presence of certain types of block-owners.  
These dummy variables addressed a long standing issue, highlighted in Rubin (2007), over the 
distinction between very different types of block and institutional owners and that even 
distinctions between these entities are often used inter-changeably.  This builds from more 
dispersed evidence across the literature regarding the differing abilities of different types of 
block shareholder in alleviating asymmetric information and thus liquidity.  In terms of state 
ownership and both Leland and Pyle (1977) and Perotti (1995) reveal evidence that retained 
ownership by the state (government) during the listing process acts to reduce informational 
asymmetries, thereby boosting liquidity, while signalling positive intentions by the state to 
minority investors in its joint role as insider within the firm and external controller of political 
and regulatory environment within which the firm is embedded.  Long term foreign investors 
arising from foreign direct investment (FDI) are another prominent class of investor.  Rhee 
and Wang (2009) find evidence in Indonesian listed firms that foreign investors are better 
placed to reduce informational asymmetry and thereby reduce liquidity.  This finding is 
further elaborated upon by evidence from Ng et al (2011) that foreign direct investors increase 
informational asymmetry and illiquidity while foreign portfolio investors have the opposite 
effect.  The broader agency literature also ascribes differential impacts on asymmetric 
information arising from entrepreneurial owner-founders retaining leadership (Jensen and 
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Meckling, 1976) with a lack of operational track record in many entrepreneurial firms serving 
to exacerbate asymmetries.  Venture capitalist (VC) investors too can be categorized in terms 
of their bringing multiple agency relationships into the focal firm with these arising from their 
acting as managing agents of funds owned by their own external principal-investors (see 
Arthurs et al, 2008).  Bruton et al (2010) argue that VC entities are best placed within the firm 
to signal value to minority investors and thus reduce informational asymmetries while Hearn 
and Piesse (2013) find evidence of a differential role between foreign VC enhancing liquidity 
while the opposite is true of domestic VC.  A final ownership category considered in the 
Hearn and Piesse study is that of family controlled firms.  The findings suggest that family 
control has a detrimental impact on liquidity.  However a shortfall in this study is in the 
extremely broad classification of family – where this typically includes firms owned and 
controlled by singular family entities as well as those which are constituent to very large, 
extended business groups, containing many such firms bound together by a common 
controlling core family (see Khanna and Rivkin (2001) and Khanna and Palepu (1997) for 
discussion on family business groups).  While there has been evidence of marked 
asymmetries of information perpetuated by the distinctive separation of ownership (cash flow 
rights) from control (voting rights), with this typically taking the form of pyramids, extensive 
cross-shareholdings and board interlocks (Claessens et al, 2000), it is only very recently that 
evidence in literature (Hearn, 2011, 2013) has supported anecdotal evidence of these family 
business groups permeating North African economies.  Furthermore considerable media 
attention during the Arab Spring political upheavals has focussed on the roles of these 
extended business groups centred on close family members of ruling political elites in the 
expropriation of both public and private sector wealth.  In this light my second contribution is 
in considering the impact on liquidity spreads arising from dummy (1/0) variables signifying 
ownership of the individual firm by state, long term foreign partners (FDI), founding-
entrepreneur, domestic and foreign VC entities as well as a unique differentiation between the 
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firm being controlled by a singular family entity as opposed to being constituent to a much 
more extensive family-controlled business group.  In order to assess the impact of ruling 
political family’s business group in Tunisia and Morocco on liquidity I further account for 
individual firm’s being constituent to Morocco’s SNI business group, owned by King 
Mohammed VI, and the extended network of Tunisia’s Ben-Ali. 
 The final contribution of this paper is in undertaking a study on the impact of state-
level institutional quality across North Africa on liquidity in two unique pre and post Arab 
Spring sample windows.  There are significant shortfalls in the previous literature relating 
institutional quality to liquidity.  Lesmond (2005) employs quarterly data and a variety of 
institutional measures that are unrelated in their construction.  Hearn and Piesse (2013) use 
World Bank Governance institutional measures, that benefit from being homogenous in their 
construction techniques, but a drawback is in their limited availability in annual frequency.  
Consequently I address these shortfalls in using seven ICRG (PRS) country-level institutional 
measures, namely corruption levels, investment profile, government stability, socio-economic 
conditions, military in politics, democratic accountability and finally law and order. 
 The data are a sample of 24,238 monthly bid-ask spread estimates for a 
comprehensive sample of listed firms across North Africa.  Owing to considerable intra-
market segmentation (see Hearn, 2010, 2011 for extended discussion on North Africa) I use 
listings segments (compartments) with their obvious variation in regulatory and disclosure 
requirements as a means to segregate listings into distinct markets.  Thus the sample is 
comprised of three Moroccan markets, namely main board (Marché Principal), SME 
development board (Marché Développement), and high growth fledgling (Marché Croissance), 
one Tunisian market, namely main board (Marché Principal), and then three Egyptian markets, 
constituents of EGX30 index, those stocks in rest of market outside of this, and those stocks 
listed on Nilex SME development board.  I find evidence that the liquidity costs in 
development and growth boards of all national markets have been influenced more by onset 
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of Arab Spring than top tier main boards inferring equity capital rationing with external stock 
market finance becoming progressively more costly in times of political upheaval.  Generally 
the findings suggest that there is an indiscernible impact arising from foreign partner on 
liquidity, while state and entrepreneurial founder act to reduce liquidity.  However individual 
family controlled firms as well as those constituent to extended family business groups are 
likely to have elevated illiquidity.  A notable feature is that the business group of former 
political premier in Tunisia (Ben-Ali) increases illiquidity as is the case with Morocco’s SNI 
business group in the context of the high growth market (Marché Croissance) with weak 
regulation, the opposite is true in the main board (Marché Principal).  More generally I find 
evidence that the simple LOT (1999) proportion of zero returns is superior to other measures 
in explaining liquidity, defined as bid-ask spread plus commissions, across pre and post-Arab 
Spring sample time frames.  Lastly I find evidence of significant differences in the 
institutional determinants of liquidity between pre and post-Arab Spring samples.  This is 
most apparent in democratic accountability with this being associated to elevated illiquidity 
pre-Arab Spring while the opposite is true post-Arab Spring.  This is most likely explained by 
a change in the type of government with autocratic state being overthrown and systematically 
reformed into a popularist democratic institution.  As such this underlying change in type of 
government would also explain the increased importance of government stability and 
especially the military in politics institutional quality measures in post as opposed to pre-Arab 
Spring samples. 
 This study proceeds with the next section introducing the liquidity measures, their 
construction, and the firm governance and market controls.  Section 3 outlines data, while 
section 4 details the empirical methods.  Section 5 discusses results and the final section 
concludes. 
 
2.  LIQUIDITY MEASUREMENT AND DETERMINANTS 
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2.1  Liquidity benchmark:  Total trading costs (Bid Ask spread and commission cost) 
The bid-ask spread is calculated using the average of the available monthly quotes with a 
minimum of a single month’s quote for that month and the average used for the spread. This 
minimizes outliers and averages out highs or lows in quotes that result from monthly 
sampling.  Finally, following Lesmond (2005) negative bid-ask spreads and those that exceed 
80% are removed.  The monthly quoted spread is defined as: 
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Following Lesmond (2005) the total trading transaction costs are estimated with the costs 
associated with a round trade being added on to the quoted spread for each month.  Brokerage 
and Exchange fees are calculated from the fee schedules detailed in final column of Appendix 
Table 1.  When a percentage commission fee is not provided the maximum fixed cost is 
applied to the aggregate daily traded value data. 
 
2.2  Liquidity measures 
2.2.1  Proportion of zero daily returns measure 
The proportion of daily zero returns measure over a period of trading days in a given month is 
based on the measure first introduced by Lesmond et al (1999).  The monthly proportion of 
daily zero returns is calculated on a stock-by-stock basis using: 
 

n
DM
turnDailyZero
D 1
Re
1         (2) 
where MD  is the number of days in the month, M. 
 
2.2.2  The Amihud (2002) measure 
Following Amihud (2002) and the more recent application by Lesmond (2005) the Amihud 
price-impact measure is constructed using closing stock prices to form daily returns.  To 
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control for outliers, a data error filter eliminates daily prices that are +/- 50% of the prior 
day’s price and that day’s price as well as previous day’s price were removed.  Equally if zero 
volume occurs on day t, then that day is not included in the average.  Finally, the measure is 
multiplied by 106 following Amihud (2002) to provide a common representation of measures 
and facilitate comparison.  The final measure is defined as: 
 

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2.2.3  Liu (2006) measure 
This follows Liu (2006) and is defined as LMx which is the standardized turnover-adjusted 
number of zero daily trading volumes over the prior x months (x = 1, 6, 12), that is: 
xLM  =  months-prior xin  mesdaily volu ofNumber  + 

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Deflator
turnovermonthx1  
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where “x month turnover” is the turnover over the prior x months, calculated as the sum of the 
daily turnover over the prior x months, daily turnover is the ratio of the number of shares 
traded on a day to the number of shares outstanding at the end of the day, “NoTD” is the total 
number of trading days in the market over the prior x months, and Deflator is chosen such that, 
 
1
1
0 
Deflator
turnovermonthx          (5) 
for all sample stocks1.  Given the turnover adjustment (the second term in brackets in (5)), 
two stocks with the same integer number of zero daily trading volumes can be distinguished: 
the one with the larger turnover is more liquid.  Thus the turnover adjustment acts as a tie-
breaker when sorting stocks based on the number of zero daily trading volumes over the prior 
x months.  Because the number of trading days can vary from 15 to 23, multiplication by the 
factor (21x/ NoTD) standardizes the number of trading days in a month to 21, which makes 
                                                 
1 In line with Liu (2006) a deflator of 11,000 is used in constructing estimates for LM1 
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the liquidity measure comparable over time.  LM1 can be interpreted as the turnover-adjusted 
number of zero daily trading volumes over the prior month.  The liquidity measure, LMx is 
calculated at the end of each month for each individual stock based on daily data. 
 
2.2.4  Turnover 
The turnover measure is defined as follows: 
 

M
t
tM volumeD
1
goutstandin-shares1        (6) 
where MD  is the number of days in the month, M.  It should be noted that there is 
considerable variation on both a inter as well as intra-market basis and that any turnover 
statistics that exceed 100% of the shares outstanding in any month are removed.  The shares-
outstanding is determined at the start of the year and remains constant for the 12 months 
thereafter. 
 
2.2  The North African business environment 
The North African (Maghreb) informal institutional environment is overwhelmingly 
dominated by classical Islamic shari’ya law (Kuran (2004, 2005)) with partnership being the 
central commercial form together with strong emphasis on extended family values both in 
terms of morality as well as to mitigate often very high transactions costs (Hearn, 2011).  
However despite underlying notions of Islamic social justice, partnerships as a commercial 
form are limited in duration owing to their dissolution upon death of one of founding partners.  
Equally the emphasis on risk-sharing amongst even latent partners infers prohibitively high 
monitoring costs which effectively inhibits the pooling of risks across investors leading to the 
pooling and mobilization of savings necessary in financial intermediation (Kuran, 2004).  As 
a consequence of the need to retain competitiveness in lucrative trans-Mediterranean trade 
routes, French civil code law political, governmental and legal institutions were transplanted 
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in Egypt and Tunisia, while colonial conquest inferred the wholesale adoption of these 
institutions in Algeria and Morocco.  These transplanted formal institutions introduced new 
limited liability contracts to the Maghreb region’s business environment while the French 
civil law system of governance underscored a centralised legal system reinforced by a polity 
dominated by social elites (La Porta et al, 1998, 2000).  While the centralised promotion of 
state organs, dominated by social elites, is promoted in French civil code law, the role of the 
state is further emphasised through the adoption of credit mutual organizations to assist in the 
state’s strategic provision of credit, similar to that undertaken in France itself.  These are 
particularly prevalent in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia.  However the very nature of the 
narrow political economies and their domination by social elites, reinforced by legal systems 
engendering the centralised role of state in economic affairs, across North Africa infers less 
recognition and protection of minority investor property rights reflected in substantial 
transactions costs.  As a consequence the formation of extended business networks centred on 
families is a natural result arising from superior coordination and allocation efficiencies 
between group members thereby mitigating the prohibitively high transactions costs that 
would arise from external contracting.  As such individual families alongside extended family 
and business networks dominate the Maghreb business environment in addition to more 
recent privatization initiatives relating to the restructuring and sale of cumbersome former 
state owned enterprises. 
 A significant drawback in prior liquidity studies, such as Lesmond (2005), is the 
omission from consideration of the impact on liquidity arising from these powerful alternative 
governance mechanisms such as family, business networks and state as well as the effects 
arising from the signalling of value of incumbent firms by early-stage investors such as 
foreign and domestic venture capitalists.  Consequently I introduce seven controls that take 
value 1 if condition is satisfied and 0 otherwise for the involvement of state, presence of a 
long term foreign partner, which is a prevalent feature in gradual part-privatization processes 
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(Perotti, 1995), entrepreneurial owner-founder retaining leadership role on board, whether 
firm is dominated by single family or is part of an extended family/business network and then 
whether domestic or foreign venture capital firms are involved as early-stage investors.  The 
differentiation between single family and extended family/business network is justified from 
recent literature regarding differences in levels of altruism displayed within families 
embedded within firms.  Lubatkin et al (2007) outlines a typology of five types of altruism in 
family firms with only some of these having positive connotations for external minority 
investors.  Furthermore a large literature centred on Claessens et al (1999, 2000) argues that 
the separation of ownership from control, primarily through pyramidal structures, cross-
shareholdings and multiple share voting structures infers considerable potential for 
expropriation of minority outsider shareholders.  As such I differentiate between firms that are 
owned and controlled by a single cohesive family unit and large extended business networks 
of firms.  As such two additional control variables are included to account for the extended 
business networks of the ruling and former ruling family’s in Tunisia and Morocco, namely 
Ben Ali and SNI, the investment vehicle of Moroccan royal family.  The complexity involved 
in tracing often disparate firms that share a common bond through being constituents to a 
larger business group is demonstrated in Figure 1.  This reveals the extensive nature of 
Morocco’s SNI business group that permeates throughout the national economy and 
underscores the ubiquitous nature of business groups with SNI alone accounting for over 12% 
of listed firms on national Moroccan exchange.  Finally all controls were formed from study 
of individual firm’s ownership and board structure, which has been translated from Arabic to 
English available from Mubasher.info website for all listed firms from across Middle East 
region. 
Figure 1 
 
2.3  Maghreb equity markets 
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North Africa’s stock markets are generally well organized with separate listings 
compartments to support the listing and trading of corporate and government debt as well as a 
variety of classes of equity.  Trading systems are also generally sophisticated, adopting the 
latest advances in market microstructural optimization, such as adopting pre-opening and pre-
close auctions into continuous systems, and are often adapted from proven technology in 
leading overseas exchanges, such as the adoption of Euronext ATOS platform in both Tunisia 
and Morocco (see Appendix 1).  Furthermore once adopted these systems are adapted for 
implementation into the business environment within which the exchanges are embedded.  
This is reflected in the parallel maintenance of continuous and auction-based trading systems 
in Tunisia and Morocco, where individual stocks liquidity differentiates upon which system it 
is traded, with liquidity being determined according to a centrally controlled algorithm.  Large 
institutional orders for stock that have irregular frequency are transacted through a designated 
block trade market (Marché de blocs) via over-the-counter trading in the case of Morocco (see 
Ghysels and Cherkaoui (2003) for discussion).  Similar consideration of business, trading and 
market microstructural environment has led to the adoption of simple electronic call auction 
for retail orders and separately for block-orders on Mondays and Wednesdays in the Algerian 
bourse where there is little demand for external stock market finance owing to a dominant 
banking sector and prevalence of internal sources of capital.  It is also notable that this 
environmental ambivalence towards stock market external finance has caused the Tunisian 
and Moroccan bourses to operate schemes of extensive corporate tax breaks in order to attract 
new listings.  All exchanges have a centralised electronic book entry system and order 
matching is prioritised in accordance to price (first) and time of receipt (second).  Equally all 
exchanges have relatively homogenous trading hours, albeit with the sole exception of the 
fledgling Algerian auction market where trading only occurs on Monday and Wednesday.  
The Egyptian equity market is by far the largest in the region with the exchange supporting 21 
subsidiary trading boards, including the prestigious main board alongside Nilex SME board 
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and a variety of OTC boards.  These latter OTC boards are notable inasmuch that they sustain 
the infrequent trading of firms that have been delisted (also termed as unlisted) from main 
boards owing to the progressive implementation and adoption of onerous (and costly) 
accounting and disclosure regulations, causing formal listings to shrink from a figure of 
approximately 800 in 2002 to a current 256 firms. 
 However while many of the differences in secondary market trading systems across 
North African markets are a function of the size and activity of market in relation to wider 
economy, a more fundamental source of intra-market segmentation arises from the regulatory 
provisions of various listings compartments within the exchanges (see Appendix Table 2).  
Algeria being by far the smallest market, with only 4 listings, has a single equity listing 
compartment, Le Compartment des Actions, while the Moroccan and Tunisian exchanges 
have adopted a more differentiated marketplace.  The Moroccan bourse has three listings tiers: 
the main board, Marché Principal, the SME development board, Marché Développement, and 
finally a third segment aimed at small but very high growth firms, Marché Croissance.  Each 
listing segment differs substantially in terms of financial reporting standards, minimum sales 
requirements for firms intending to list, and minimum amounts of shares to be issued, as 
detailed in Appendix Table 2.  The Tunisian exchange has two compartments:  the main board, 
Marché Principal, and SME development board, Le Marché Alternatif.  All firms across the 
three Algerian. Moroccan and Tunisian markets are classified by the exchanges in terms of 
their respective listings compartments which form an obvious boundary for the segmentation 
within these markets.  This classification justifies my use of this system in studying the 
efficacy of liquidity measures within each listing category.  However the very large scale of 
the Egyptian equity market with multiple listings compartments is complimented by less of an 
emphasis in Egypt on firms categorized by their listings compartment but rather in accordance 
to their being constituents to a range of bespoke internationally recognized indices, such as 
the EGX30.  This is in line with evidence that the Egyptian market is recipient to significant 
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overseas institutional investment (see Hearn, 2010, 2011).  Consequently this justifies the 
focus of study into the efficacy of liquidity measures on firms constituent to the prestigious 
EGX30 index and then those listed on main board but falling outside of this benchmark.  A 
final segment considered in Egypt is that of the small SME market, Nilex board. 
 
2.4  Political risk determinants of liquidity 
In order to investigate the impact of political institutional quality on liquidity I use the 
political institutional risk indices that are themselves sub-components of the aggregate 
political risk index used in forming the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rating for 
countries (PRS Group website, 2012).  A key benefit from using ICRG political risk measures 
is that these are reported on a monthly basis as opposed to the annual basis common to 
majority of institutional quality indices which is beneficial owing to the smaller time periods 
involved in study of North African markets.  Equally the use of law and order measure of 
judicial efficiency follows from Lesmond (2005).  I use seven ICRG political risk measures, 
namely investment profile and government stability, with both rated on scale 0 to 12, 
corruption, socio-economic conditions, military in politics, democratic accountability and law 
and order, all rated on scale 0 to 62.  These measures have been selected over other ICRG 
political risk indicators owing to their applicability to North African region, where external 
conflict is rare and religious and ethnic tensions are not significant owing to general 
homogeneity of societies and dominance of Islam as religion.  As such these provide a largely 
unique and comprehensive insight into the impact of political institutions and risks on 
liquidity. 
 
                                                 
2 Monthly time series estimates are provided by PRS Group Inc. (www.prsgroup.com) for all four North African 
countries included in study.  The overall ICRG political risk measure is an amalgamation of 12 sub-component 
indices and ranges from 0 to 100.  Each of the individual sub-component political risk measures, as used in this 
study, are rated on scale of either 0 to 12 or 0 to 6 with lower values being associated to greater risk.  However 
owing to potential correlation between measures (see Lesmond (2005) for detail) each measure is recursively 
included in models. 
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3.  DATA  
3.1  Maghreb (North African) business environment 
A significant observation from the evidence in Table 1 is the extensive prevalence of 
extended family networks and business groups where these are particularly common in 
Morocco and Tunisia.  In contrast state activity in both markets is generally confined to the 
main boards while a nuance of the Moroccan market arises from high concentration of state 
participation in the high growth market (Marché Croissance) where this routinely takes the 
form of the extended networks of state private investment agencies such as CDG.  Similarly 
in Egypt the constituent firms of the top tier blue chip EGX30 index have high degree of 
extended family group/network affiliation which dissipates rapidly across the lower tiers of 
the Egyptian market (specifically across the firms constituent to main board that are not 
constituent to EGX30) and the fledgling small and medium enterprise (SME) development 
board, Nilex. Generally the involvement of foreign partners is largely confined to top tier blue 
chip firms constituent to main boards.  There is a similar concentration of foreign venture 
capital involvement in top tier blue chip firms with much less involvement in smaller and 
more riskier firms in SME boards or constituent to the main board outside of the top tier 
prestigious indices, while the opposite is true of domestic venture capital with this being more 
concentrated in these lesser well known firms.  Algeria being a fledgling stock market in an 
economy overwhelmingly dominated by banking system and state provision of credit is 
notable in having a high proportion of listings arising from state privatizations. 
 There is considerable dispersion in political institutional quality across the Maghreb 
region with Morocco generally being associated with the least risk across all measures and 
Egypt being susceptible to the highest levels of political risk.  However Algeria has the lowest 
measure associated with corruption – indicating the greatest risk associated with this indicator.  
It is notable that the greatest risk associated with military involvement in politics is in Egypt 
which is almost twice as high as Morocco and Tunisia in contrast. 
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Table 1 
 
3.2  Data and impact of Arab Spring 
Some general observations can be made about the data in Table 23.  The first is that bid-ask 
spread measure of illiquidity as well as the price-rigidity proportion of zero returns measures 
increased substantially in the sample period following the onset of the Arab Spring, defined as 
January 2011 onwards, in Egypt and Morocco, whilst the opposite is true in the case of 
Tunisia where there is increased liquidity and markedly less rigidity in stock price returns.  
This may be a reflection of the minimal and largely peripheral role of the stock market in 
business financing in Tunisia (Zribi, 2008).  However in the case of Egypt and Morocco there 
are considerable increases in the relative elevation of illiquidity and price rigidity following 
the onset of Arab Spring in the lesser listings boards, i.e. in Marché Développement and 
Marché Croissance in Morocco which may reveal the impact of equity market capital 
rationing.  This would infer that the least well regulated markets, that have watered down 
regulation to attract SME firms and facilitate grass roots private sector investment, and more 
susceptible to political uncertainties than their more well regulated main board counterparts.  
A final observation across the sample market listings boards confirms that the less well 
regulated listings boards, such as Marché Développement and Marché Croissance in Morocco 
or EGX30 constituents as opposed to main board firms not constituent to this index in Egypt, 
have lower trading volumes and lower market capitalizations than their top tier blue chip main 
board counterparts. 
Table 2 
 
                                                 
3 Spearman’s rank correlations between Stoll market controls and five liquidity measures, including bid-ask 
spread, for every equity market listing segment across North Africa.  These have been undertaken on overall 
sample as well as sub-samples for per and post Arab Spring periods respectively.  These reveal a general 
increase in size of correlations with all other variables associated with price and volume in post Arab Spring 
period in contrast to period pre-Arab Spring.  These are available from author upon request. 
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Further evidence of the impact of the Arab Spring period of social upheaval can be seen from 
Figures 2 to 5.  These contrast the time series evolution of monthly average of daily traded 
volumes, monthly average of daily proportion of zero returns, and bid-ask spreads across a 
time span of January 2002 to June 2012 for Algeria (Figure 2), Tunisia (Figure 3) and Egypt 
(Figure 5), while data corresponding to a shorter time frame of January 2009 to June 2012 is 
available for Morocco (Figure 4).  While it should be noted that there are sharp increases in 
severe illiquidity between both Egypt and Tunisia for January 2011 to March 2011, 
corresponding to the onset of Arab Spring, in contrast the large increase in trading activity in 
Algeria is more likely attributable to the late 2010 listing of its fourth firm, Alliance 
Assurances, which is the first private sector listing in the country.  The evidence from Figure 
4 would reveal that the Moroccan bourse was largely unscathed by political upheavals in its 
neighbours, Egypt and Tunisia. 
Figures 2 - 5 
 
4.  ESTIMATION 
4.1  Relationship between liquidity measures and bid-ask spread plus commission costs 
An assessment of liquidity measures ability in explaining total costs 
To determine this relationship a number of regression models are estimated using OLS.  For 
each of the markets a single regression is estimated where the endogenous variable is the bid-
ask spread plus commission as described in Appendix Table 1.  The regressors are the three 
liquidity measures introduced first individually and then all together.  Seven governance 
related controls are introduced, where these are involvement of state, foreign partner, 
entrepreneurial-founder on board, individual family, extended family/business group and then 
domestic as opposed to foreign venture capital.  In the case of Tunisia and Morocco a further 
governance dummy was introduced accounting for impact of single investment entity 
(business group) associated with ruling family, Ben-Ali in Tunisia and SNI (royal family) in 
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Morocco.  A final dummy was also included in Tunisia to account for the fledgling SME 
board, where with 4 listed firms and only a very recent inception reducing the historical time 
series, was a dummy to account for this alternative board necessitated.  However only in 
Egypt is the development board administered by a company, Nilex, that is separate from the 
main Egyptian exchange itself.  Finally four additional variables are included to control for 
daily stock returns volatility, the mean of the daily price for one month, traded volume and 
market capitalization, with the latter three in natural logarithms, following Stoll (2000).  Price 
proxies for discreteness (Harris, 1994), risk and bid-ask spread (Benston and Hagerman, 
1974), while volume indicates market depth (Pagano, 1989) and market capitalization is 
commonly reflected in bid-ask spreads (Stoll and Whaley, 1983).  Volatility is closely tied to 
liquidity as thin, speculative markets tend to more volatile than their deep counterparts 
(Cohen et al, 1976).  Owing to persistence in liquidity measures over time (see Petersen (2009) 
for an extended discussion) I have estimated the standard errors by clustering them on time 
dimensions using White cross section robust standard errors  and covariances method.  This 
ensures that inferences, based on standard errors, is robust to correlation across residuals 
within a firm over time4. 
 
Direct model comparisons:  Vuong likelihood ratio test 
A useful likelihood ratio test for model selection in the absence of specifying a null 
hypothesis that either model is true is outlined in Vuong (1989) and applied in a similar 
context by Lesmond (2005).  A detailed mathematical exposition is outlined in the appendix 
of Lesmond (2005)5.  This tests the null hypothesis that either model is equally as good at 
explaining the underlying data generating process for liquidity with an alternate hypothesis 
that one is better than the other.  The likelihood ratio Z-score test statistic indicates whether 
                                                 
4 White cross section robust standard errors and covariances method has been used in all estimations to account 
for period clustering over time for either firms or countries/markets 
5 This exposition is also available from author upon request 
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the reference model is better at explaining the comparison model with a one-sided probability.  
The reference models in this case are either the turnover or Liu liquidity measures, and the 
comparison models are a group of “controls” resulting from combination of Stoll (2000) 
variables and the six firm governance measures, and then the zero daily returns and the Liu 
measure.  The zero daily returns is a comparison model in the Liu reference model tests.  A 
positive and significant one-sided probability indicates that the turnover or Liu measure is 
statistically superior to the competing liquidity measures.  Lesmond (2005) asserts that a 
positive sign for the Z-score test statistic indicates the reference model has a higher R2 
regression statistic than the competing models.  However given the significance of the 
political and institutional upheaval and changes during the course of the Arab Spring and their 
likely impact on wider transactions costs, Vuong tests were undertaken on sample pre and 
post onset of the Arab Spring. 
 
4.3  The institutional determinants of liquidity 
Finally, assuming a lack of variation in institutions within countries, random effects were 
applied as this specification adjusts the variance for country-level cross-correlation due to 
common omitted factors within each country, following Lesmond (2005).  This is preferred to 
a fixed effects regression because of the lack of variation for the institutional variables within 
each country.  This is a particularly strong issue in North African environment as all countries 
extensively adopted (transplanted) Napoleonic French civil code formal institutions (legal, 
governmental, judicial, political) and while Egypt nominally adopted English language upon 
its incorporation into British Empire it retained its former civil code formal institutions (Hearn, 
2011).  Consequently there is marked similarity in institutions and institutional development 
across the Maghreb region.  Following from the preceding arguments of institutional change 
across North African countries in period following the ongoing Arab Spring political 
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upheaval and likely impact on transactions costs across environment, I perform random 
effects tests on sample pre and then post Arab Spring. 
 
5.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1  Relationship between liquidity measures and bid-ask spread plus commission costs 
An assessment of liquidity measures ability in explaining total costs 
All models were estimated with dependent variables being both the total trading costs (bid-ask 
spread plus commissions) as well as bid-ask spread on its own for robustness.  The results in 
both cases are very similar.  However in keeping with the background literature (Lesmond, 
2005) I report the results for total trading costs here.  As such the evidence in Table 3 reveals 
that across all Moroccan listing compartments (and models) there is a large positive and 
highly statistically significant association between both the simple proportion of zero returns 
measure and the volume-based turnover construct with bid-ask spread plus commission (total 
trading costs measure).  The coefficients of association between price-impact construct of 
Amihud and multidimensional measure of Liu with total trading costs dependent variable are 
small in size and while tending to be marginally statistically significant (at 90% confidence 
level) when added into models recursively (individually) lose this significance in the grand 
regressions including all liquidity (illiquidity) measures together.  A similar pattern is visible 
across all Tunisian models with the additional strength and statistical significance of 
association between Amihud measure and total trading costs.  However in this case it is 
notable that the coefficient of association of both Amihud measure and proportion of zero 
returns construct are extremely small in size.  Finally there are sharp differences revealed 
between Egyptian EGX30 constituents, remainder of Egyptian main board and Nilex SME 
market in terms of associations between liquidity (illiquidity) measures and total trading costs.  
Turnover and Liu constructs have large, positive and statistically significant associations with 
dependent variable across EGX30 constituents while a similarly significant association 
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between proportion of zero returns is reduced in effectiveness by its very small size.  The 
volume-based turnover measure has an equally sizeable and significant association with 
dependent variable across the stocks forming the remainder of Egyptian main board outside of 
the EGX30.  However while there are additional significant associations between dependent 
variable and both Liu and Amihud constructs, these are reduced in effectiveness by their very 
small size.  Finally the only measure with persistent statistical significance in its association 
with total trading costs dependent variable in Egypt’s Nilex SME market is that of the 
proportion of zero returns.  Overall the evidence suggests that the simple price-rigidity 
proportion of zero returns and volume-based turnover constructs have stronger association 
with total trading costs than either the Amihud or Liu measures. 
 The evidence from across all markets reveals that the Arab Spring has had a marked 
impact on levels of illiquidity across North Africa’s equity markets, although this is greatest 
in Morocco and Egypt and lacking statistical significance in Tunisia.  In particular the effect 
increases in accordance to increasingly weak regulation, with the Arab Spring being 
associated with a 0.3%-0.4% level of transactions costs measured by total trading costs (bid-
ask spread plus brokerage commissions) for the Moroccan main board (Marché Principal ) 
which increases to 0.8% for Morocco’s Marché Développement and ultimately to 1.6% in 
Morocco’s Marché Croissance.  Similarly transactions costs as measured by total trading costs 
associated with Arab Spring are 1.7%-1.9% across the constituents of Egypt’s EGX30 index, 
before rising to 2.3% across remainder of main board, before rising again to between 4.3% 
and 4.8% in Nilex.  These findings are in line with earlier evidence indicating equity capital 
rationing has likely resulted from the Arab Spring inferring that private sector development 
reforms across North Africa are likely to be hindered by a lack of available equity capital for 
SME firms.  Equity capital rationing being defined as being very similar to credit market 
rationing where prohibitively high costs of equity capital inhibit firms from effectively being 
able to obtain finance from public stock markets. 
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 In terms of both firm governance and market controls and there are some notable 
observations across all market listings segments (between Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt) that 
reflect in the very different nature of transactions costs within each of these listing 
compartments or segments.  Generally across the market segments with highest levels of 
regulation, namely the top tier main boards in Morocco and Tunisia as well as EGX30 
constituent firms, there is a negative association between state and foreign partner 
involvement and illiquidity, or total trading costs.  This changes to a large, positive and 
statistically significant relationship in market segments with weaker regulation such as 
Marché Développement and Marché Croissance in Morocco as well as Egyptian main board 
stocks that are not constituent to EGX30.  There is a notable negative and statistically 
significant association between entrepreneurial firms (owner-founder on board) and total 
trading costs (illiquidity) across all markets providing some evidence of longer term 
investment horizons associated with firm’s retaining entrepreneurs.  Equally across all 
markets the extended family groups and business networks have a stronger negative 
association with total trading costs (illiquidity) than their single family counterparts reflecting 
the differences in altruistic behaviour of these entities and the enhanced separation of 
ownership from control.  However there are some differences with single family entities being 
associated with greater illiquidity across all Egyptian firms while extended family/ business 
networks are negatively associated with illiquidity across EGX30 constituent firms and 
positively associated with illiquidity across the remaining Egyptian main board firms (outside 
of EGX30).  The impact of extended family business networks on total trading costs 
(illiquidity) is further revealed in Morocco and Tunisia through specially constructed control 
representing the Moroccan royal families exclusive holding company, SNI, and Tunisia’s Ben 
Ali family’s extended network.  These both have a negative association with total trading 
costs (illiquidity) to a similar degree as the generic control for extended family business 
networks across the highest regulated main boards of Morocco and Tunisia.  However in the 
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least well regulated and high growth Marché Croissance, in Morocco, the association is large 
and positive, in contrast to the large negative association with the generic control for extended 
family networks.  This would infer that transactions costs are higher, which is likely a 
function of increased risk of expropriation, in less well regulated markets where there is a less 
onerous regulatory burden on firms to disclose sensitive corporate information.  This would 
indicate that the extended business networks of social elites across North Africa have the 
propensity to expropriate only when regulation is sufficiently weak thereby increasing the 
motivation to expropriate from minority outside investors with relative impunity (Claessens et 
al, 1999).  Finally the evidence across all markets reveals that there is a greater negative 
association between foreign venture capitalist involvement and total trading costs (illiquidity) 
than that of their domestic counterparts. 
 The relationships across the Stoll market controls are largely as intuitively expected 
and similar to those reported in Lesmond (2005).  Stock price is generally negatively 
associated with total trading costs (illiquidity) as is traded volume while there is a positive 
association between volatility.  The association between market capitalization and total 
trading costs is more mixed with a combination of both positive and negative coefficients 
which is similar to results reported in Lesmond (2005) as well as within the Sub Saharan 
African context in Hearn and Piesse (2012a, b) and Hearn (2013) in West Africa. 
Table 3 
 
Contrasting the liquidity measures:  Vuong likelihood ratio test 
The Vuong (1989) maximum likelihood tests are in Table 4 and examine the rejection of the 
Stoll (2000) variables or the competing liquidity constructs in favour of the three reference 
measures, that is proportion of daily zero returns, turnover and Liu (2006).  These were 
performed on sample both pre and post Arab Spring. 
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 These results reveal that the greatest changes in transactions costs are in Egypt and the 
Moroccan main board.  In particular the positive and statistically significant coefficient for 
both Amihud as well as turnover versus the proportion of zero returns construct in pre-Arab 
Spring sample indicates that the proportion of zero returns had higher explanatory power of 
the bid-ask spread than competing Amihud or turnover constructs.  This infers that price-
rigidity had a more prominent role in explaining bid-ask spread in stocks constituent to the 
Egyptian EGX30 index than rival volume-based measures of transactions costs.  However the 
change in direction of both coefficients in post-Arab Spring sample underscores the changes 
in transactions costs in the Egyptian business environment where volume-based measures 
have a more prominent role.  This is further exemplified by the positive and highly 
statistically significant coefficients in Amihud versus turnover in the context of Egyptian 
main board stocks (outside of EGX30) and Egyptian main board overall where post-Arab 
Spring volume-based measures of turnover better explain bid-ask spreads.  Equally the 
positive and statistically significant coefficients in Liu versus proportion of zero returns for 
Egyptians main board (outside EGX30) and overall main board (including EGX30 stocks) in 
pre-Arab Spring sample reveals price-rigidity is superior in explaining bid-ask spread than 
multidimensional Liu indicator.  However the reversal in direction (to negative) of both 
coefficients post-Arab Spring infers that price-rigidity is less of a dominant issue in 
measurement of transactions costs in period following Arab Spring in the lower levels of the 
Egyptian main board and the Nilex SME market.  In contrast to the lower tiers of the Egyptian 
market, the evidence from the positive and statistically significant coefficients for Liu versus 
Stoll controls, proportion of zero returns, and comparative group of liquidity measures, 
indicates the relative weakness of this multidimensional construct in contrast to alternative 
measures and in particular the proportion of zero returns for the constituent stocks of EGX30.  
As such this would infer some support for increased importance of price-rigidity in 
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determining illiquidity in top tier EGX30 constituents post Arab Spring while this has less of 
a role in explaining illiquidity in the lower levels of Egyptian market. 
Table 4 
 
5.2  The determinants of liquidity: political institutions 
The results of random effects regressions through the recursive addition of each of seven 
ICRG political institutional risk measures in addition to market controls in terms of explaining 
bid-ask spread illiquidity are outlined in Table 5.  In general the results are in line with 
preceding findings in Lesmond (2005) where an inverse relationship between institutional 
quality (judicial quality and political risk) and liquidity was reported.  However there are 
some notable differences in the pre and post-Arab Spring sub samples.  In particular there is a 
change of direction (sign) in relationship between democratic accountability institutional 
measure and liquidity.  In the pre-Arab Spring sample this is positive and statistically 
significant at 90% while this relationship is almost exactly reversed in the post-Arab Spring 
sample, where coefficient is same size but negative and statistically significant.  Following the 
arguments of Lesmond (2005) more autocratic governments, dominated by handfuls of social 
elites with considerable vested state level private benefits of control, are less likely to 
relinquish these in order to implement policies that would enhance liquidity and protect 
minority investors.  Thus under these circumstances (pre-Arab Spring) enhanced democratic 
accountability will likely lead to weaker centralized authority and inability to implement 
liquidity enhancing policies.  However following the onset of the Arab Spring and substantial 
political upheavals, newly formed reformist and popularist governments (as opposed to their 
autocratic pre-Arab Spring counterparts) are likely to be less dominated by social elites and 
their private interests.  Thus they are likely both more susceptible to enhanced democratic 
accountability but also in being better able to enact policy measures to protect minority 
investors and enhance liquidity.  Further justification of these arguments regarding the 
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democratic accountability and type of government (autocratic and controlled by handful of 
social elites as opposed to popularist) and impact on liquidity is also in the attenuation of 
statistical significance for the negative coefficients between bid-ask spread and both “military 
in politics” and “government stability” institutional quality measures.  Both coefficients 
attained statistical significance of 99-95% and 90% respectively in post-Arab Spring sample 
from a lack of any significance in pre-Arab Spring sample.  Similar results are obtained from 
random effects models using Liu, Amihud, turnover and proportion of zero daily returns 
measures as dependent variable which are not reported6. 
Table 5 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper contrasts four illiquidity (liquidity) measures, namely proportion of zero daily 
returns, Amihud (2002), Liu (2006) and turnover constructs in their ability to explain bid-ask 
spread plus brokerage commissions across listings segments in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and 
Egypt.  A unique aspect to this study is the splitting of sample into pre Arab Spring and post-
Arab Spring and the use of seven well established ICRG political institutional risk measures 
alongside a further seven firm governance controls that take account of dominant governance 
structures prevalent in Maghreb business environment. 
 I find evidence supporting assertion that equity capital rationing has taken place over 
the Arab Spring inferring that illiquidity levels attributable to the Arab Spring are higher in 
market segments with weaker regulation, such as SME and high growth boards.  This is likely 
to hinder political reforms designed to engender private sector growth.  Furthermore I find 
that firms falling within extended family business networks have lower levels of illiquidity 
than firms dominated by a single family entity.  However firms belonging to the extended 
network of SNI, representing the Moroccan royal family, are likely to have lower illiquidity in 
                                                 
6 Results are available from author upon request and are omitted due to brevity considerations 
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the better regulated main board while their counterparts will have elevated illiquidity in the 
much smaller high growth market where information disclosure is less onerous.  This would 
infer that the likelihood of potential expropriation is greatest within large extended networks 
where incumbent firms are in less visible and well regulated areas of economy leading to 
elevated illiquidity. 
 Finally I find marked differences in political institutional risk determinants pre and 
post Arab Spring across bid-ask spread, proportion of zero daily returns, turnover and Liu 
transactions costs measures.  In particular illiquidity transcending Arab Spring period is 
closely associated with corruption, risks of military involvement in politics, democratic 
accountability and law and order measures.  These are largely reflective of the changes to 
political economies having been initiated during Arab Spring with greater emphasis on 
universal suffrage and reduction in domination of polity by social elites with substantial 
private benefits of control. 
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Table 1.  Sample descriptive statistics 
Table contrasting average firm governance characteristics across all listed firms from every stock market in SSA region against six institutional quality measures.  The firm governance 
measures are dummy variables taking value 1 if condition is satisfied and 0 otherwise for involvement of state, foreign partner, entrepreneurial founder retained on board, whether firm is part of 
extended family group/ business network and whether domestic as opposed to foreign venture capitalists (VC) participate in ownership and organizational structure.  These controls are sourced 
from financial reporting service Mubasher.net as well as websites of individual firms, stock exchanges and national regulatory authorities.  Dummy variables are formed from each year of 
listing for each firm.  The average values are presented for each of the six political institutional risk indices (developed by PRS Group and ICRG) across all markets.  Ratings scales are 
provided for each measure, where lower values indicate greater risks attributed to that measure. 
Market  Proportions of listed firms with involvement of following entities  Political Institutional measures 
 N State Foreign 
Partner 
Owner/ 
Founder 
Single 
Family 
Family/ 
Bus. 
Group 
VC 
Domestic 
VC 
Foreign 
 Corrupt Invest. 
Profile 
Gov. 
Stability 
Socio 
Econ 
Cond. 
Military 
in 
Politics 
Democrat. 
Account 
Law & 
Order 
  % % % % % % %  0 - 6 0 - 12 0 - 12 0 - 12 0 - 6 0 - 6 0 - 6 
Algeria 4 75.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.00 0.00 0.00  1.83 7.71 8.32 5.00 3.00 3.54 3.00 
                 
Morocco                 
Marché Principal 42 21.43 38.10 7.14 14.29 69.05 26.19 14.29  2.95 9.21 8.19 6.50 4.00 4.56 4.95 
Marché Développement 16 6.25 6.25 12.50 37.50 50.00 6.25 0.00  2.95 9.21 8.19 6.50 4.00 4.56 4.95 
Marché Croissance 18 11.11 33.33 5.56 33.33 33.33 5.56 11.11  2.95 9.21 8.19 6.50 4.00 4.56 4.95 
Morocco: Overall 76 15.79 30.26 7.89 23.68 56.58 17.11 10.53  2.95 9.21 8.19 6.50 4.00 4.56 4.95 
                 
Tunisia                 
Marché Principal 58 29.31 25.86 3.45 13.79 51.72 10.34 6.90  2.52 7.98 9.30 5.81 3.88 2.00 4.88 
Le Marché Alternatif 4 25.00 25.00 50.00 25.00 50.00 50.00 0.00  2.52 7.98 9.30 5.81 3.88 2.00 4.88 
Tunisia: Overall 62 29.03 25.81 6.45 14.52 51.61 12.90 6.45  2.52 7.98 9.30 5.81 3.88 2.00 4.88 
                 
Egypt                 
EGX30 30 13.33 13.33 23.33 20.00 53.33 10.00 10.00  2.00 6.31 7.29 4.94 2.39 1.77 3.30 
Main (excl. EGX30) 195 35.29 17.11 6.42 8.56 30.48 15.51 5.35  2.00 6.31 7.29 4.94 2.39 1.77 3.30 
Egypt: Main Overall 225 32.26 16.59 8.76 10.14 33.64 14.75 5.99  2.00 6.31 7.29 4.94 2.39 1.77 3.30 
                 
Egypt: Nilex 20 5.56 0.00 16.67 33.33 16.67 5.56 0.00  2.00 6.18 6.46 4.96 1.98 1.62 3.16 
Source: Compiled by author from national stock exchanges and Bloomberg.  Institutional measures obtained direct from PRS website: http://www.prsgroup.com/countrydata.aspx 
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Table 2.  North African equity market summary statistics 
Comprehensive descriptive statistics for 20 SSA equity markets including 12 that are included in final sample.  Start dates vary for each country while sample end dates are 
June 2012 across all markets.  N refers to sample size, or number of stocks included.  Price is the average of daily prices over each month and is converted to US$ using the 
average exchange rate for each month and country to facilitate comparison.  Volume is the average of the daily trading volume over each month and is stated in thousands.  
Market capitalization is measured as of 1 January for each country and is equity market value for each firm expressed in millions of local currency or US$.  The bid-ask spread 
is generated through  
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 applied to respective monthly bid and ask prices for individual stocks.  The monthly average is 
taken across all stocks to obtain a market wide measure.  The monthly average is taken across all stocks to obtain a market wide measure.  The US$ market capitalization is 
derived using the end of month exchange rate for each country and month.  Square parentheses indicate median values for each variable. 
   Local market    US$ equivalent   
   Pre-Arab Spring Post-Arab Spring Overall sample   
Country Sample 
Start 
N Bid-Ask 
spread (%) 
Zero Return 
(%) 
Bid-Ask 
spread (%) 
Zero Return 
(%) 
Volume (shares, m) Price Mkt. Cap (b) 
Algeria 01/2000 4 -- -- 96.40 [96.77] -- -- 97.90 [100.00] 0.003 [0.001] 8.26 [5.90] 0.054 [0.050] 
          
Morocco          
Marché Principal 01/2009 42 2.13 [1.67] 51.22 [45.16] 2.85 [2.48] 52.11 [48.33] 0.322 [0.023] 91.56 [58.15] 1.438 [0.499] 
Marché Développement 01/2009 16 3.76 [2.99] 63.05 [64.52] 5.12 [4.68] 67.19 [70.97] 0.021 [0.003] 82.78 [62.28] 0.128 [0.063] 
Marché Croissance 01/2009 18 4.73 [3.89] 72.72 [77.42] 7.10 [5.97] 77.75 [82.50] 0.004 [0.001] 70.47 [46.12] 0.034 [0.027] 
Overall 01/2009 76 3.06 [2.41] 57.22 [53.33] 4.28 [3.51] 61.18 [57.60] 0.009 [0.002] 33.10 [34.69] 0.017 [0.016] 
          
Tunisia          
Marché Principal 08/2000 58 2.28 [1.04] 52.38 [46.67] 2.09 [1.19] 53.97 [46.67] 0.226 [0.078] 18.38 [7.27] 0.166 [0.066] 
Le Marché Alternatif 01/2009 4 3.32 [3.15] 66.37 [71.16] 1.79 [1.42] 48.78 [46.61] 1.408 [0.045] 4.87 [4.94] 0.073 [0.014] 
Overall 08/2000 62 2.68 [1.79] 65.20 [64.52] 2.07 [1.26] 53.68 [45.79] 0.317 [0.081] 17.74 [7.19] 0.163 [0.065] 
          
Egypt          
EGX30 02/2002 30 1.77 [0.82] 45.01 [35.48] 4.13 [2.78] 44.27 [36.08] 37.457 [13.258] 3.94 [1.57] 1.271 [0.695] 
Main Market (excl. EGX30) 02/2002 195 6.60 [2.35] 62.66 [61.29] 9.84 [5.99] 55.20 [38.71] 4.763 [0.282] 7.50 [2.19] 0.179 [0.043] 
Main Market Overall 02/2002 225 5.98 [2.02] 60.59 [51.61] 9.04 [5.56] 53.75 [38.71] 9.161 [0.549] 7.07 [2.19] 0.313 [0.054] 
          
Nilex 06/2010 20 13.51 [12.31] 75.84 [85.19] 10.36 [10.05] 81.44 [91.02] 1.719 [0.112] 3.83 [1.97] 0.015 [0.011] 
Source: Compiled by author from Bloomberg, Datastream and National stock exchanges 
Notes: (1) US$ Exchange rates from Bloomberg; (2) The three listing compartments of Morocco are:  Marché Principal, Marché Développement and Marché Croissance. 
These are the “main board”, “development board” and “high growth/alternative market” respectively.  Similarly the listings compartments in Tunisia are: 
Marché Principal and Le Marché Alternatif.  These are “main board” and “Alternative SME market” respectively.  In Egypt the separate autonomous Nilex exchange 
acts as the national SME alternative market. 
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Table 3  Total costs on liquidity proxies and measures 
The results of the panel regression tests are based on a firm-monthly basis using bid-ask spread plus commission as the dependent variable.  Three liquidity measurement variables 
are presented.  Liu is the measure of Liu (2006) and represents a standardized turnover-adjusted number of zero returns over the prior month.  Turnover is a ratio of the traded 
volume of shares in relation to total number of shares outstanding and is scaled by the number of trading days in the month of measurement.  It provides a measure of trading 
frequency.  The final measure is the Bid Ask spread which is the average daily relative bid ask spread over the prior 1 month, where daily relative spread is the local currency 
denominated spread divided by average of Bid and Ask prices.  Firm size is determined from the first day of each month.  Volatility is the average daily stock return variance and 
price and volume measure the average price (local currency units) and trading volume over an annual trading period.  Turnover, price, volume, and market capitalisation are all log 
scaled in line with Stoll (2000).  SME Firm development boards in Tunisia are accounted for by a dummy.  N is the sample size in firm months.  The White cross-section t-statistics 
are in parentheses.  Bold values delineate those that are statistically significant in excess of 90% confidence margin 
 Morocco: Marché Principal (N = 1,636)     
 Controls Zero (%) Amihud Liu Turnover Overall Overall 
Intercept 0.065 [14.75] † 0.021 [6.43] † 0.065 [14.76] † 0.045 [7.41] † -0.199 [-12.69] † -0.105 [-5.01] † -0.102 [-4.95] † 
% Zero Returns  0.001 [18.94] †    0.0001 [4.50] † 0.0001 [4.76] † 
Amihud   2.26E-05 [0.98]   -2.74E-06 [-0.31] -3.05E-06 [-0.35] 
Liu    0.002 [4.11] †  0.001 [5.51] † 0.001 [5.53] † 
Turnover     0.022 [14.77] † 0.012 [5.82] † 0.012 [5.78] † 
Institutional Controls        
Arab Spring 0.004 [4.53] † 0.003 [4.50] † 0.004 [4.53] † 0.004 [5.42] † 0.004 [5.42] † 0.004 [5.18] † 0.004 [5.22] 
Ownership Controls        
State -0.004 [-5.45] † 4.79E-05 [0.08] -0.004 [-5.21] † -0.001 [-1.42]* 4.70E-05 [0.08] 0.001 [1.20] 0.001 [1.64]* 
Foreign Partner -0.002 [-3.14] † -0.003 [-3.38] † -0.002 [-3.05] † -0.001 [-1.44]* -0.0002 [-0.22] -0.001 [-1.29]* -0.001 [-1.62]* 
Founder 0.001 [0.85] -0.002 [-1.96]** 0.001 [0.79] -0.002 [-2.37] † -0.003 [-4.26] † -0.003 [-4.09] † -0.003 [-4.06] † 
Single Family -0.009 [-8.01] † -0.005 [-4.65] † -0.009 [-7.69] † -0.005 [-4.04] † -0.001 [-1.36]* -0.002 [-1.78]** -0.002 [-2.86] † 
Family/ Business Group -0.002 [-4.05] † -0.002 [-2.46] † -0.002 [-3.98] † -0.001 [-1.68]** 0.001 [1.12] 0.0001 [0.18] -- -- 
SNI (business group) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.002 [-3.88] † 
Domestic VC 0.003 [3.94] † 0.002 [3.36] † 0.003 [4.06] † 0.002 [3.83] † 0.001 [2.27]** 0.001 [2.78] † 0.002 [3.29] † 
Foreign VC -0.005 [-7.05] † -0.003 [-4.60] † -0.005 [-7.14] † -0.004 [-5.38] † -0.001 [-1.93]** -0.002 [-2.97] † -0.002 [-4.00] † 
Market Controls        
Price -0.003 [-5.17] † -0.002 [-3.31] † -0.003 [-4.74] † 9.05E-05 [0.14] -0.022 [-14.16] † -0.012 [-5.72] † -0.012 [-5.64] † 
Volatility 0.593 [9.82] † 0.879 [16.55] † 0.590 [9.71] † 0.605 [11.32] † 0.711 [14.90] † 0.765 [13.49] † 0.775 [13.68] † 
Volume -0.005 [-13.69] † -0.002 [-7.82] † -0.005 [-13.35] † -0.001 [-1.97] † -0.024 [-16.95] † -0.013 [-6.37] † -0.013 [-6.30] † 
Size 0.001 [2.34] † -6.26E-05 [-0.19] 0.001 [2.20]** -0.001 [-2.82] † 0.022 [14.98] † 0.011 [5.41] † 0.011 [5.33] † 
Adj-R2 (%) 0.5420 0.6813 0.5433 0.6593 0.7062 0.7239 0.7253 
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 Morocco: Marché Développement (N = 556)     
 Controls Zero (%) Amihud Liu Turnover Overall  
Intercept -0.149 [-5.84] † -0.107 [-4.92] † -0.153 [-6.00] † -0.093 [-3.54] † -0.300 [-11.35] † -0.197 [-4.35] †  
% Zero Returns  0.001 [14.50] †    4.69E-04 [5.51] †  
Amihud   3.60E-05 [1.88]**   2.36E-06 [0.15]  
Liu    0.002 [7.00] †  -2.45E-05 [-0.06]  
Turnover     0.021 [7.28] † 0.010 [2.13]**  
Institutional Controls        
Arab Spring 0.008 [5.50] † 0.006 [4.79] † 0.008 [5.37] † 0.007 [5.75] † 0.006 [5.22] † 0.006 [4.85] †  
Ownership Controls        
State 0.010 [1.87]** 0.011 [2.30]** 0.010 [1.82]** 0.009 [1.80]** 0.011 [2.29]** 0.011 [2.32] †  
Foreign Partner -0.0002 [-0.02] 0.004 [0.67] -0.0004 [-0.07] 0.009 [1.27] 0.007 [1.08] 0.006 [0.93]  
Founder -0.007 [-4.01] † -0.001 [-0.76] -0.006 [-3.81] † -0.0001 [-0.07] -0.001 [-0.52] -0.0005 [-0.23]  
Single Family -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --  
Family/ Business Group -0.003 [-1.71]** -0.003 [-1.58]* -0.003 [-1.53]* -0.0005 [-0.24] -0.002 [-1.28]* -0.002 [-1.28]*  
SNI (business group) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --  
Domestic VC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --  
Foreign VC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --  
Market Controls        
Price -0.004 [-5.97] † -0.003 [-3.83] † -0.004 [-5.18] † -0.002 [-2.30] † -0.024 [-8.24] † -0.013 [-2.63] †  
Volatility 0.803 [5.86] † 1.298 [10.89] † 0.790 [5.75] † 0.909 [7.79] † 1.162 [11.53] † 1.300 [12.45] †  
Volume -0.005 [-9.10] † -0.002 [-3.74] † -0.005 [-8.89] † -7.69E-05 [-0.11] -0.023 [-8.86] † -0.012 [-2.41] †  
Size 0.012 [10.01] † 0.006 [4.54] † 0.012 [10.07] † 0.005 [2.96] † 0.026 [13.14] † 0.015 [3.33] †  
Adj-R2 (%) 0.4769 0.6132 0.4778 0.5664 0.6009 0.6241  
 40 
 
 Morocco: Marché Croissance (N = 584)     
 Controls Zero (%) Amihud Liu Turnover Overall Overall 
Intercept 0.055 [1.87]** -0.005 [-0.17] 0.054 [1.84]** 0.049 [1.61]* -0.184 [-4.18] † -0.172 [-3.49] † -0.109 [-2.35] † 
% Zero Returns  0.001 [9.08] †    4.01E-04 [3.90] † 3.72E-04 [3.39] † 
Amihud   3.04E-05 [0.68]   4.33E-05 [0.80] 5.69E-05 [1.03] 
Liu    0.001 [1.68]**  -0.001 [-1.78]** -0.001 [-1.82]** 
Turnover     0.018 [7.11] † 0.015 [4.37] † 0.014 [4.30] † 
Institutional Controls        
Arab Spring 0.016 [6.83] † 0.013 [6.00] † 0.016 [6.85] † 0.016 [6.76] † 0.013 [6.14] † 0.012 [5.66] † 0.012 [5.87] † 
Ownership Controls        
State 0.011 [1.38]* 0.016 [2.20]** 0.011 [1.34]* 0.012 [1.47]* 0.016 [2.02]** 0.017 [2.25]** 0.010 [1.50]* 
Foreign Partner 0.022 [6.40] † 0.012 [3.44] † 0.022 [6.31] † 0.020 [5.46] † 0.01 [2.49] † 0.009 [2.16]** 0.018 [4.53] † 
Founder 0.242 [2.04]** 0.236 [1.93]** 0.243 [2.03]** 0.241 [2.00]** 0.231 [1.85]** 0.230 [1.85]** 0.226 [1.81]** 
Single Family -0.002 [-0.65] -0.003 [-1.00] -0.002 [-0.60] -0.002 [-0.70] -0.003 [-1.03] -0.003 [-1.10] 0.004 [2.11]** 
Family/ Business Group -0.007 [-1.48]* -0.012 [-2.54] † -0.007 [-1.44]* -0.007 [-1.52]* -0.009 [-2.01]** -0.011 [-2.58] † -- -- 
SNI (business group) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.009 [2.09]** 
Domestic VC -0.002 [-0.18] -0.016 [-1.56]* -0.001 [-0.12] -0.004 [-0.33] -0.013 [-1.28]* -0.017 [-1.65]** 0.002 [0.20] 
Foreign VC -0.007 [-2.90] † -0.004 [-2.05]** -0.007 [-2.90] † -0.007 [-2.88] † -0.004 [-2.27]** -0.003 [-1.80]** -0.001 [-0.38] 
Market Controls        
Price 9.64E-05 [0.07] -0.002 [-1.40]* 3.14E-04 [0.21] 0.001 [0.48] -0.020 [-5.86] † -0.018 [-4.13] † -0.018 [-4.18] † 
Volatility 0.793 [5.17] † 1.174 [8.92] † 0.772 [5.18] † 0.789 [5.08] † 0.971 [6.17] † 1.145 [7.58] † 1.129 [7.30] † 
Volume -0.005 [-6.43] † -0.002 [-2.50] † -0.004 [-6.24] † -0.003 [-2.17]** -0.019 [-9.09] † -0.016 [-4.86] † -0.016 [-4.82] † 
Size 0.0001 [0.07] 0.001 [0.36] 2.58E-05 [0.01] -0.001 [-0.57] 0.019 [5.87] † 0.017 [3.99] † 0.013 [3.19] † 
Adj-R2 (%) 0.4623 0.5032 0.4616 0.4670 0.5079 0.5171 0.5178 
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 Tunisia: Overall (N = 5,836)      
 Controls Zero (%) Amihud Liu Turnover Overall Overall 
Intercept 0.098 [26.40] † 0.071 [13.29] † 0.097 [26.54] † 0.078 [14.17] † -0.021 [-1.80]** -0.010 [-0.52] -0.015 [-0.80] 
% Zero Returns  2.11E-04 [9.90] †    9.97E-05 [3.12] † 1.06E-04 [3.28] † 
Amihud   -2.55E-07 [-7.71] †   -2.45E-07 [-6.49] † -2.45E-07 [-6.52] † 
Liu    0.001 [4.75] †  5.92E-05 [0.23] 4.17E-05 [0.16] 
Turnover     0.009 [9.45] † 0.007 [3.82] † 0.007 [3.83] † 
Institutional Controls        
Arab Spring -4.70E-04 [-0.66] 0.001 [1.07] -0.001 [-0.72] -0.0001 [-0.17] 1.65E-06 [0.002] 4.30E-04 [0.70] 3.14E-04 [0.51] 
Alternative Market 0.004 [1.85]** 0.004 [1.82]** 0.004 [2.02]** 0.003 [1.52]* 0.003 [1.35]* 0.004 [1.58]* 0.003 [1.31]* 
Ownership Controls        
State -0.002 [-3.86] † -0.002 [-4.11] † -0.002 [-3.81] † -0.002 [-3.58] † -0.002 [-3.94] † -0.002 [-3.95] † -0.002 [-4.22] † 
Foreign Partner -4.87E-04 [-1.05] -0.0004 [-0.83] -0.0005 [-1.07] -0.0003 [-0.55] 1.50E-05 [0.03] -3.64E-05 [-0.08] -1.67E-04 [-0.38] 
Founder -0.003 [-3.20] † -0.003 [-2.93] † -0.003 [-3.29] † -0.003 [-3.33] † -0.003 [-3.21] † -0.003 [-3.17] † -0.003 [-3.01] † 
Single Family -0.001 [-1.29]* -0.001 [-1.15] -0.001 [-1.00] -0.001 [-1.64]* -0.001 [-1.57]* -0.001 [-1.45]* -0.001 [-1.48]* 
Family/ Business Group -0.0004 [-0.72] -0.001 [-1.48]* -3.67E-04 [-0.64] -0.001 [-1.29]* -0.001 [-1.28]* -0.001 [-1.36]* -- -- 
Ben Ali (business group) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.002 [-3.92] † 
Domestic VC -0.001 [-1.78]** -0.001 [-1.32]* -0.001 [-1.82]** -0.002 [-2.25]** -0.002 [-2.53] † -0.002 [-2.21]** -0.002 [-2.47] † 
Foreign VC -2.74E-04 [-0.57] 1.80E-04 [0.38] -2.83E-04 [-0.59] -3.33E-05 [-0.07] -3.37E-04 [-0.76] -1.02E-04 [-0.24] -0.001 [-1.86]** 
Market Controls        
Price -0.004 [-13.30] † -0.003 [-7.11] † -0.004 [-13.40] † -0.003 [-7.02] † -0.012 [-12.13] † -0.009 [-4.57] † -0.010 [-4.61] † 
Volatility 0.421 [7.76] † 0.487 [7.39] † 0.441 [7.90] † 0.386 [6.98] † 0.391 [7.04] † 0.445 [6.41] † 0.444 [6.40] † 
Volume -0.006 [-23.83] † -0.005 [-15.93] † -0.006 [-23.96] † -0.004 [-9.58] † -0.013 [-14.24] † -0.011 [-5.27] † -0.011 [-5.29] † 
Size -3.69E-04 [-1.44]* -0.001 [-2.58] † -0.0003 [-1.28]* -0.001 [-3.96] † 0.008 [8.42] † 0.006 [3.16] † 0.007 [3.30] † 
Adj-R2 (%) 0.4154 0.4291 0.4166 0.4297 0.4390 0.4422 0.4431 
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 Egypt: EGX30 (N = 2,269)      
 Controls Zero (%) Amihud Liu Turnover Overall  
Intercept 0.078 [11.06] † 0.054 [2.44] † 0.076 [11.20] † 0.037 [2.02]** -0.327 [-1.89]** -0.244 [-1.25]  
% Zero Returns  4.07E-04 [1.28]*    -3.56E-04 [-3.10] †  
Amihud   1.26E-04 [1.54]*   4.48E-05 [0.62]  
Liu    0.004 [2.08]**  0.002 [1.30]*  
Turnover     0.036 [2.29]** 0.028 [1.49]*  
Institutional Controls        
Arab Spring 0.020 [3.72] † 0.019 [4.71] † 0.020 [3.75] † 0.017 [5.67] † 0.017 [5.61] † 0.017 [5.74] †  
Ownership Controls        
State -0.004 [-1.51]* -0.004 [-1.50]* -0.004 [-1.54]* -0.005 [-1.79]** -0.006 [-1.99]** -0.006 [-2.08]**  
Foreign Partner -0.002 [-1.59]* -0.001 [-0.64] -0.001 [-1.50]* -0.001 [-1.28]* -0.001 [-0.97] -0.001 [-1.55]*  
Founder -0.009 [-4.31] † -0.010 [-4.14] † -0.009 [-4.53] † -0.011 [-4.30] † -0.012 [-4.44] † -0.012 [-4.64] †  
Single Family 0.008 [4.47] † 0.009 [4.53] † 0.009 [4.68] † 0.010 [5.03] † 0.010 [5.19] † 0.011 [5.51] †  
Family/ Business Group -0.006 [-3.00] † -0.007 [-3.06] † -0.006 [-3.14] † -0.007 [-3.27] † -0.008 [-3.40] † -0.008 [-3.43] †  
Domestic VC -0.002 [-2.65] † -0.003 [-2.60] † -0.002 [-2.63] † -0.003 [-2.94] † -0.003 [-3.01] † -0.003 [-2.99] †  
Foreign VC -0.008 [-5.13] † -0.009 [-4.45] † -0.008 [-5.43] † -0.010 [-5.00] † -0.010 [-5.08] † -0.010 [-5.01] †  
Market Controls        
Price 3.92E-04 [0.38] 0.003 [1.05] 0.001 [0.59] 0.002 [1.57]* -0.034 [-2.27]** -0.027 [-1.43]*  
Volatility 0.159 [1.45]* 0.138 [1.49]* 0.147 [1.37]* 0.061 [0.73] 0.043 [0.61] 0.021 [0.30]  
Volume -0.003 [-3.23] † -0.001 [-1.38]* -0.002 [-2.98] † -0.0004 [-0.42] -0.037 [-2.40] † -0.029 [-1.52]*  
Size -0.001 [-1.06] -0.001 [-1.73]** -0.001 [-1.16] -0.002 [-2.44] † 0.034 [2.23]** 0.027 [1.42]*  
Adj-R2 (%) 0.1150 0.1280 0.1163 0.1567 0.1622 0.1660  
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 Egypt: Main Board (excl. EGX30) (N = 13,215)     
 Controls Zero (%) Amihud Liu Turnover Overall  
Intercept 0.146 [13.99] † 0.124 [4.65] † 0.143 [13.58] † 0.139 [11.94] † -0.023 [-0.30] -0.022 [-0.40]  
% Zero Returns  2.13E-04 [1.03]    -1.04E-04 [-0.61]  
Amihud   3.78E-05 [2.40] †   2.92E-05 [1.83]**  
Liu    4.94E-04 [2.65] †  2.29E-04 [2.12]**  
Turnover     0.013 [2.32] † 0.014 [3.42] †  
Institutional Controls        
Arab Spring 0.023 [4.05] † 0.023 [4.15] † 0.023 [4.08] † 0.023 [4.13] † 0.023 [4.35] † 0.023 [4.29] †  
Ownership Controls        
State -0.008 [-8.94] † -0.008 [-5.94] † -0.008 [-8.90] † -0.008 [-7.87] † -0.007 [-5.06] † -0.007 [-4.92] †  
Foreign Partner 0.003 [3.01] † 0.003 [3.47] † 0.003 [3.13] † 0.003 [3.05] † 0.003 [3.36] † 0.003 [3.43] †  
Founder -0.011 [-5.73] † -0.010 [-5.12] † -0.010 [-5.70] † -0.010 [-5.63] † -0.009 [-5.19] † -0.009 [-4.95] †  
Single Family 0.007 [5.55] † 0.007 [5.63] † 0.007 [5.47] † 0.006 [5.52] † 0.007 [5.79] † 0.006 [5.57] †  
Family/ Business Group 0.002 [3.54] † 0.002 [3.47] † 0.002 [3.66] † 0.002 [3.61] † 0.002 [3.32] † 0.002 [3.46] †  
Domestic VC -0.004 [-6.51] † -0.004 [-5.61] † -0.004 [-6.53] † -0.004 [-6.21] -0.004 [-5.95] -0.004 [-5.62] †  
Foreign VC 2.77E-04 [0.22] -3.80E-04 [-0.24] 1.48E-04 [0.12] 0.001 [0.41] 1.77E-04 [0.14] 0.001 [0.34]  
Market Controls        
Price 0.003 [3.58] † 0.005 [3.58] † 0.004 [3.94] † 0.004 [4.50] † -0.009 [-1.57]* -0.009 [-2.40] †  
Volatility 0.233 [4.38] † 0.231 [4.32] † 0.232 [4.43] † 0.231 [4.39] † 0.227 [4.18] † 0.226 [4.25] †  
Volume -0.005 [-11.10] † -0.004 [-4.12] † -0.005 [-11.50] † -0.004 [-8.04] † -0.017 [-3.26] † -0.017 [-4.65] †  
Size -0.002 [-4.88] † -0.003 [-6.55] † -0.002 [-4.96] † -0.003 [-6.64] † 0.011 [1.82]** 0.011 [2.72] †  
Adj-R2 (%) 0.2405 0.2437 0.2424 0.2458 0.2517 0.2542  
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 Egypt: Nilex (N = 142)      
 Controls Zero (%) Amihud Liu Turnover Overall  
Intercept 0.348 [1.97]** 0.341 [1.98]** 0.352 [2.00]** 0.269 [1.59]* 0.094 [0.48] 0.285 [0.99]  
% Zero Returns  0.001 [2.79] †    0.001 [2.05]**  
Amihud   2.83E-04 [0.58]   2.71E-04 [0.63]  
Liu    0.004 [2.09]**  3.85E-04 [0.08]  
Turnover     0.020 [2.43] † 0.004 [0.21]  
Institutional Controls        
Arab Spring 0.043 [2.71] † 0.043 [3.41] † 0.042 [2.75] † 0.048 [3.18] † 0.049 [3.27] † 0.044 [3.56] †  
Ownership Controls        
State -0.015 [-1.28]* -0.017 [-1.28]* -0.015 [-1.29]* -0.012 [-0.88] -0.014 [-0.98] -0.017 [-1.29]*  
Foreign Partner -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --  
Founder 0.014 [1.05] 0.016 [1.28]* 0.013 [0.91] 0.016 [1.29]* 0.016 [1.29]* 0.015 [1.28]*  
Single Family -0.021 [-1.29]* -0.023 [-1.28]* -0.022 [-1.28]* -0.028 [-1.51]* -0.026 [-1.50]* -0.025 [-1.30]*  
Family/ Business Group 0.022 [0.91] 0.020 [0.88] 0.020 [0.86] 0.014 [0.59] 0.015 [0.66] 0.016 [0.73]  
Domestic VC 0.029 [0.92] 0.019 [0.66] 0.030 [0.97] 0.030 [1.04] 0.018 [0.59] 0.020 [0.69]  
Foreign VC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --  
Market Controls        
Price 0.010 [1.36]* 0.011 [1.36]* 0.011 [1.41]* 0.004 [0.48] -0.014 [-1.03] 0.006 [0.27]  
Volatility 1.313 [5.12] † 1.628 [5.95] † 1.267 [5.15] † 1.592 [5.27] † 1.620 [5.50] † 1.635 [5.48] †  
Volume -0.011 [-5.55] † -0.007 [-3.12] † -0.010 [-3.48] † -0.005 [-1.28]* -0.026 [-4.00] † -0.010 [-0.44]  
Size -0.012 [-1.28]* -0.018 [-1.60]* -0.013 [-1.28]* -0.015 [-1.36]* 0.006 [0.48] -0.015 [-0.56]  
Adj-R2 (%) 0.1595 0.1959 0.1556 0.1808 0.1717 0.1807  
Notes: (1) * p > 90% level; ** p > 95% level; † p > 99% level; (2) White cross section robust standard errors and covariances (d.f. corrected) (period clustering) 
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Table 4  Likelihood ratio tests 
A likelihood ratio test, developed by Vuong (1989) for non-nested model selection, is presented for each country.  The models compared are based on the regressions of the bid-
ask spread and the Amihud (2002) measure, Turnover, the Liu (2006) measure of liquidity.  The control variables are the natural logarithms of Traded Volume, price, market 
capitalisation and volatility, following Stoll (2000). A Z-statistic, using a one sided probability, is the basis of determining if the Amihud estimate or Turnover or Liu (the 
reference models) are better at explaining the true bid-ask spread data generating process than alternative liquidity proxies, or the comparison models tested either singularly or as 
a group.  The group contains all the competing liquidity measures excluding the reference estimate.  A positive and significant Z-statistic indicates that the comparison models 
are rejected in favour of the reference model.  These cases are in bold type.  N is sample size in firm-months.  Bold values delineate those that are statistically significant in 
excess of 90% confidence margin 
Market N Amihud versus TO versus Liu versus 
  Stoll Zeros TO Liu Group Stoll Zeros Liu Group Stoll Zeros Group 
Pre-Arab Spring              
Morocco Marché Principal 902 -12.56† -8.70† 2.74† -9.89† -10.84† -16.36† -11.54† -12.20† -14.92† 1.08 3.38† 1.72** 
Morocco Marché Développement 307 -9.80† -7.70† -3.31† -6.21† -7.53† -9.63† -5.96† -5.20† -6.97† -0.56 -0.12 -0.59 
Morocco Marché Croissance 326 -5.72† -5.51† -1.34* -4.03† -5.40† -5.59† -4.28† -3.56† -4.83† -3.69† -1.07 -1.28* 
              
Tunisia Overall 4,853 -17.71† -15.15† -8.27† -11.41† -14.17† -18.39† -12.72† -9.08† -12.39† -5.42† 3.31† 3.02† 
              
Egypt EGX30 1,763 -2.22** 1.28* 0.62 -0.03 -1.24 -2.36† 1.28* -0.47 -1.46* -2.00** 0.89 -0.44 
Egypt Main (excl. EGX30) 10,394 -5.51† -1.66* -2.18** -3.07† -4.14† -4.86† 0.02 -1.73** -2.30** -4.66† 2.20** 0.35 
              
Post-Arab Spring              
Morocco Marché Principal 693 -10.32† -10.65† -1.96** -6.62† -12.40† -15.84† -7.46† -5.64† -10.71† -1.88** 0.65 0.37 
Morocco Marché Développement 235 -11.77† -8.90† -2.69† -5.88† -7.67† -9.00† -6.39† -5.23† -7.14† -2.63† 0.23 0.09 
Morocco Marché Croissance 242 -6.45† -3.28† -1.38* -2.22** -2.94† -7.77† -2.91† -1.98** -3.28† -4.88† -0.53 -1.87** 
              
Tunisia Overall 938 -7.43† -5.78† -2.26** -5.95† -6.66† -9.01† -6.43† -5.98† -7.18† -0.35 2.39† 1.90** 
              
Egypt EGX30 478 -3.45† -3.71† -0.31 -6.70† -6.72† -3.51† -3.77† -6.83† -6.01† 3.20† 3.06† 1.61* 
Egypt Main (excl. EGX30) 2,651 -2.47† -3.01† 2.14** 0.02 -3.29† -2.85† -3.46† -0.91 -4.28† -2.00** -4.28† -5.48† 
Notes: (1) * p > 90% level; ** p > 95% level; † p > 99% level; (2) White cross section robust standard errors and covariances (d.f. corrected) (period clustering) 
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Table 5  Institutional quality determinants of liquidity and price discovery random effects tests 
Market random effects regression coefficients are reported for monthly liquidity measures on each of the seven institutional quality measures for each sample group market.  
Seven markets are considered in all: 3 in Morocco: Marché Principal, Marché Développement, Marché Croissance, 1 in Tunisia, Tunisia overall, and three in Egypt: constituents 
of EGX, those stocks on main board outside of EGX30, and Nilex. The seven institutional quality measures are disseminated by ICRG (PRS Group).  Liquidity measure 
dependent variable is the bid ask spread.  The firm liquidity characteristics are price, volume and daily return volatility.  Price and volume are natural log scaled, in line with Stoll 
(2000).  Bold values delineate those that are statistically significant in excess of 90% confidence margin.  N is sample size.  The sample sizes of 175 (pre-Arab Spring) and 144 
(post-Arab Spring) are monthly time series formed from cross sectional averages (averages of across all stocks in each market universe) for each respective market.  Algeria is 
excluded from samples as is a Call Auction trading system and not quote driven (no bid/ ask prices) 
 Bid Ask Spread (Illiquidity) - Pre-Arab Spring (N = 175)    
Political Institutional measure Corruption Investment 
Profile 
Government 
Stability 
Socio Economic 
Conditions 
Military in 
Politics 
Democratic 
Accountability 
Law and Order 
Intercept 0.186 [2.91] †† 0.414 [4.75] †† 0.223 [2.56] † 0.565 [6.69] †† 0.307 [2.01]** 0.166 [2.60] †† 0.484 [4.65] †† 
        
Corruption -0.015 [-3.87] ††       
Investment Profile  -0.024 [-4.57] ††      
Government Stability   -0.002 [-0.71]     
Socio Economic Conditions    -0.063 [-7.30] ††    
Military in Politics     -0.030 [-0.92]   
Democratic Accountability      0.015 [1.28]*  
Law and Order       -0.056 [-4.55] †† 
        
Market Cap. 0.001 [0.07] -0.010 [-1.02] -0.003 [-0.30] -0.011 [-1.28]* -0.004 [-0.40] 0.001 [0.12] -0.012 [-1.28]* 
Traded Volume -0.012 [-3.20] †† -0.014 [-3.34] †† -0.013 [-3.34] †† -0.015 [-3.98] †† -0.014 [-3.55] †† -0.013 [-3.03] †† -0.014 [-3.57] †† 
Volatility 0.215 [4.38] †† 0.194 [3.27] †† 0.223 [4.61] †† 0.173 [3.64] †† 0.226 [3.87] †† 0.178 [4.37] †† 0.176 [2.65] † 
Price -0.020 [-1.28]* -0.002 [-0.14] -0.028 [-1.79]** 0.015 [0.99] -0.019 [-1.28]* -0.051 [-3.83] †† -0.0001 [-0.01] 
        
 Bid Ask Spread (Illiquidity) - Post-Arab Spring (N = 144)    
Intercept 0.228 [2.57] †† 0.414 [4.75] †† 0.206 [2.38] † 0.266 [2.08]** 0.261 [3.10] †† 0.192 [1.99]** 0.349 [4.65] †† 
        
Corruption -0.022 [-2.16]**       
Investment Profile  -0.024 [-4.57] ††      
Government Stability   -0.006 [-1.28]*     
Socio Economic Conditions    -0.019 [-1.43]*    
Military in Politics     -0.019 [-3.66] ††   
Democratic Accountability      -0.016 [-1.89]**  
Law and Order       -0.031 [-4.13] †† 
        
Market Cap. -0.010 [-1.03] -0.010 [-1.02] -0.008 [-0.87] -0.009 [-0.84] -0.014 [-1.40]* -0.011 [-0.98] -0.019 [-2.26] † 
Traded Volume -0.007 [-5.89] †† -0.014 [-3.34] †† -0.007 [-5.46] †† -0.008 [-7.13] †† -0.009 [-9.49] †† -0.007 [-7.09] †† -0.007 [-6.91] †† 
Volatility -0.298 [-1.34]* 0.194 [3.27] †† -0.215 [-0.79] -0.248 [-1.08] -0.275 [-0.94] -0.282 [-1.28]* -0.345 [-1.38]* 
Price 0.007 [0.79] -0.002 [-0.14] 0.005 [0.44] 0.013 [1.28]* 0.016 [1.35]* 0.026 [2.33] † 0.025 [3.52] †† 
Notes: (1) * p > 90% level; ** p > 95% level; † p > 99% level; †† p > 99.95% level; 
(2) White cross section robust standard errors and covariances (d.f. corrected) (period clustering) 
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Appendix Table 1.  Summary of secondary market trading systems, regulations and commissions 
 Trading procedures Trading system and hours Commissions 
Algeria Single Auction market: 
 (a) Session Opening: 10mins 
 (b) Order entry and order entry into electronic call system:  45mins 
 (c) Validation of orders at the call:  15mins 
 (d) Order processing:  10mins 
 (e) Block orders by institutional investors (declaration and registration of block trades):  
 10mins 
 (f) Final reporting to regulator:  15mins 
 (g) Official close of session 
Call Auction (termed as “Le Fixing”) 
 
Monday and Wednesday only: 
9-30am – 11-30am 
 
Two secondary trading 
commissions: 
(1) buy/sell leg broker 
commission of 0.15% of 
total trade size (trade min 
size is 10 Dinar, and max is 
100,000 Dinar) 
(2) Stock exchange 
transaction fee of 0.05% of 
total amount traded 
    
Morocco Two trading compartments:  (1) Central market; (2) Block-trade market (termed as “Marché de 
blocs”).  Order priority is given first on price and then on time of receipt into centralised order 
book. 
 
(1) Central Market: all stock trades via either (1a) Auction or (1b) Continuous systems 
 (1a) Continuous system:  9-00am – 9-30am: Pre-Open; 9-30am - 15-30pm: Cont. 
 Trading; 15-30pm-16-00pm: Pre-Close 
 (1b) Auction:  9-00am – 15-30pm (assuming 3 auctions). Trading by auction involves 
 the matching of all orders entered beforehand into the electronic quote-driven trading 
 system by brokerage firms so that, as the case may be, a single price is established for 
 each security. As a function of a security’s liquidity, several auctions may occur during 
 a single session (multi-auction) 
(2) Block-trade market (“Marché de blocs” - for large, irregular institutional block trades): OTC 
(Over the Counter) 
Euronext ATOS system 
Two systems in place: (1a) Continuous (liquid 
stocks) and (1b) Auction (illiquid stocks).  
The decision criteria for individual stocks to 
trade on either system is based on following: 
- Average trading volume per session; 
- Average no. of securities traded per session; 
- Frequency that the security has traded; 
- Average no. of contracts per session; 
- Free-float capitalisation 
 
(1a) Continuous system:  9-00am-16-00pm 
(1b) Auction:  9-00am – 15-30pm (assuming 3 
auctions) 
 
Two fees: (1) Casablanca 
Stock Exchange commission 
at 0.1% of the amount of 
trading in shares and (2) 
Brokerage commissions 
levied at a rate of 0.6% more 
than the amount of the 
transaction on shares.  
Finally the total amount of 
fees is itself subject to 10% 
VAT. 
    
Tunisia Two parallel systems: (1) Auction (also termed as “Le Fixing”) and (2) Continuous. 
(1) Auction/ Fixing: 
 (a) Pre-opening session (orders fed into central order book without any trading):  1 hour 
 (b) Auction: when the order accumulation phase ends, buy and sell orders are centrally 
 matched through an auction procedure to establish an auction price The auction price of 
 a share is its reference price and is used as a basis for the following auction.  
 (c) A second pre-opening session 
 (d) The second auction takes place 
 (e) A third pre-opening session 
 (f) The third auction takes place 
 (g) Trading at last price session; orders are traded at last quoted price 
Euronext ATOS system (as in Morocco) 
All listed securities are traded on the system. 
Orders entered by brokers at their terminals 
are forwarded to the central system and 
matched 
 
Two parallel systems: 
(1) Call auction (or “Le Fixing”) for less 
liquid/traded securities.  Fixed mode trading 
occurs three times daily at 10 am,11:30 am 
and 13 pm 
Sliding scale of fees: 
Trade value> TD 50,000 – 
0.10% on buy and sell leg 
respectively 
 
Trade value< TD 50,000 – 
0.20% on buy and sell leg 
respectively 
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 Trading procedures Trading system and hours Commissions 
Tunisia (2) Continuous trading : 
 (a) Pre-opening session; in this one-hour period, orders entered by brokers are fed into 
 the order book without any transactions taking place. The system calculates a 
 theoretical opening price for all listed securities, which is displayed on the screens. 
 (b) Opening session by fixing; the system fixes the opening price or call auction price 
 at which the largest number of bids and asks can be matched. 
 (c) Continuous trading; orders arriving in the system are immediately executed if the 
 central order book contains an order or several orders of the contrary kind at a 
 compatible price. If there are no such orders, the incoming order is recorded, remaining 
 on the order book at the specified limit. 
 (d) Pre-closing session; all the orders in the book are matched for the closing auction. 
 (e) Trading at last price session; orders are traded at last quoted price. 
(2) Continuous trading order-driven system 
for most liquid securities, daily from 9am to 
14:10 pm 
 
 
    
Egypt Electronic order-driven trading system with centralised order matching that supports 21 
subsidiary “trading boards” for both listed and unlisted securities.  Order priority is given on a 
price (first) and time (second) basis although a third decision tier is buy and sell orders in same 
security from same broker are deemed lowest priority.  The most popular boards are: 
 
(1) Main Market:  No Price Limits (includes the most active traded stocks which are chosen 
based on a certain criteria) and Price Limits (the price of each stock is restricted to a 5% ceiling 
and floor from its previous closing price) 
(2) Nilex Board (SME Board): Small and Medium Enterprises 
(3) OTC Boards:  This is comprised of “Deals market” and “Orders market”: 
 (3a)  “Deals Market”  is the market at which EGX, announces all information, related 
 to the pre-arranged deals, after their execution. 
 (3b) “Orders market” set for the companies that the Exchange approves trading on 
 according to their liquidity, which also includes de-listed companies that were actively 
 traded but de-listed due to their non-compliance with the Exchange listing rules. 
EGX electronic order-driven system 
The trading day begins at 9:45 am with the 
pre-opening session which is closed randomly 
by trading system between 10:15 am and 
10:30 am 
 
(1) Main Market:  10-30am – 14-30pm 
(2) Nilex (SME market): 10-30am – 11-30am 
 
(3) OTC Boards: 
(3a) “Deals OTC”: 9-45am – 11-15am 
 
(3b) “Orders OTC”: 12-30am – 13-00pm 
(Monday and Wednesday only) 
Exchange service fees are 
levied at 0.12 per thousand 
of the value of each side of 
the transaction, with a 
maximum of LE 5,000 
Source: Compiled by author from national securities exchange websites 
Notes: (1) The exchanges of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia have slightly modified trading hours during Islamic holy month of Ramadan 
(2) It should be noted that the concept of trading boards specialising in unlisted, or delisted, securities in Egypt arises from the progressive implementation of onerous 
regulatory reforms across the Egyptian market from 2002 to 2010.  These included enhanced financial reporting and accounting disclosure requirements (such as 
necessity for listed firms to formulate and publish costly annual and semi-annual reports).  This caused an equally progressive shrinking of listed firms able to conform 
to these enhanced regulatory requirements from over 800 listed firms to the current total listings on Main board of 225 firms.  Consequently firms delisted (i.e. unlisted) 
during these reforms trade on Egyptian exchange supported boards on an OTC basis benefitting from lighter (less onerous) regulatory and financial reporting 
requirements while still benefitting from association in being able to trade equity through an affiliation to the organized central market place of the national stock 
exchange.  Organized trading in delisted and unlisted firms forms the basis for many of the 21 subsidiary boards supported by the Egyptian exchange outside of the 
prestigious official Main and Nilex boards. 
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Appendix Table 2.  Summary of secondary market regulations and fees for selected countries 
 Regulator charged with 
market surveillance 
Listing Compartment Min. No. 
Shareholder 
Min. 
Amount 
Issued 
Min. Amount 
Issued 
(US$m) 
No. Shares 
Issued 
Min. Sales No. Years 
Financial 
Statement 
Algeria Commission d'Organisation et 
de Surveillance des Opérations 
de Bourse (COSOB) 
Compartiment des Actions 300 -- -- -- -- 20% of firm’s 
capital 
-- -- 5 
         
Morocco Conseil Déontologique des 
Valeurs Mobilières (CDVM) 
Marché Principal -- -- MAD 75m 8.44 250,000 No fixed limit 3 
Marché Développement -- -- MAD 25m 2.81 100,000 Over MAD 50m 2 
Marché Croissance -- -- MAD 10m 1.12 30,000 No fixed limit 1 
         
Tunisia Conseil du Marché Financier 
(CMF) 
Marché Principal 200 TD 3m 1.87 10% of firm’s 
capital 
Profit over last 2 years 2 
Le Marché Alternatif 100 or 5 
institutional 
shareholders 
-- -- -- -- 20% of firm’s 
capital 
Profitability not a 
necessity 
-- -- 
         
Egypt Egyptian Financial Services 
Authority (EFSA) 
Main Market: Official (1) 150 L.E. 20m 3.25 2,000,000 Net profits before taxes for 
the last fiscal year >5% of 
paid-in capital 
3 
Main Market: Official (2) As above As above As above As above As above As above 
Main Market: Unofficial (1) 50 L.E. 10m 1.62 1,000,000 As above 2 
Main Market: Unofficial (2) 50 L.E. 5m 0.81 500,000 Net profits before taxes for 
the last fiscal year >1% of 
paid-in capital 
2 
Nilex 25 L.E. 50m 8.12 100,000 Discretion of listing 
committee 
1 
Source: Compiled by author from national securities exchange websites 
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Figure 1. Extent of control of Société Nationale d’Investissement (SNI) business group, 2010 – accounting for 12% of listings on Moroccan exchange 
 
Source: Compiled by author from SNI IPO listings prospectus and annual filings with Bourse de Casablanca and Moroccan regulator 
Notes: (1) Listed indicates listing on Bourse de Casablanca; (2) The 87 subsidiary firms of Attijariwafa Bank form an extensive business group network of banking, finance and 
technology firms across mostly Francophone Africa
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Figure 2.  Evolution of liquidity and traded volume in Algeria (2002 – 2012) 
Chart documenting the evolution of monthly averages of daily traded volumes and proportion of daily zero returns.  
Market monthly averages are calculated across all stocks in market to form a time series 
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Figure 3.  Evolution of liquidity and traded volume in Tunisia (2002 – 2012) 
Chart documenting the evolution of monthly averages of daily traded volumes, monthly bid-ask spreads and 
proportion of daily zero returns.  Market monthly averages are calculated across all stocks in market to form a time 
series 
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Figure 4.  Evolution of liquidity and traded volume in Morocco (2009 – 2012) 
Chart documenting the evolution of monthly averages of daily traded volumes, monthly bid-ask spreads and 
proportion of daily zero returns.  Market monthly averages are calculated across all stocks in market to form a time 
series 
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Note: Shorter length of data available from 2009 to 2012. 
 
Figure 5.  Evolution of liquidity and traded volume in Egypt (2002 – 2012) 
Chart documenting the evolution of monthly averages of daily traded volumes, monthly bid-ask spreads and 
proportion of daily zero returns.  Market monthly averages are calculated across all stocks in market to form a time 
series 
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Note: Units of volume traded are in 100,000 shares and not 10,000 shares as in all other markets.  This is to take 
account of the significant size of Egyptian equity market 
